The

SPECTRUM

Imperative

We Must Assume the Spectrum Will Be Contested

Operating under Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, Low-Bandwidth (DDIL) conditions must become a foundational assumption. Reliable connectivity will be the exception, not the norm.
Chinese military
Platforms, manned or unmanned, need to be engineered from inception for resilience against these threats. We must incorporate frequency agility, robust mesh networking capabilities and autonomous AI-powered functionalities. Any system we field, must be designed to ensure continuous operations even in heavily contested environments.
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brings down over 10,000 Ukrainian drones every month
Russian jamming

In our next major conflict, jamming and spoofing will be ubiquitous.

All branches of our military
rely on RF-dependent systems.

02-risk
US military vehicles

From remotely-piloted aircraft to advanced guided munitions, our reliance on radio communications will only increase as we increase our dependence on drones and other remotely operated, unmanned platforms.

Since 2022, Russia and Ukraine’s widespread use of electronic warfare has resulted in the loss of thousands of drones monthly, significantly diminishing tactical advantage on both sides. For the United States, the lessons of Ukraine are stark. If we wish to deploy our own remotely-operated, unmanned systems at scale, we must be prepared to treat the radio spectrum with the urgency it deserves. Spectrum dominance cannot be an afterthought, it must permeate everything we do.

The radio spectrum is the fifth domain of warfare.
The RC‑135 Rivet Joint platform first
RC‑135 Rivet
flew in 1961 and remains in frontline service over 60 years later.
Russia’s Krasukha‑4 can jam radar, comms, and even low-orbit satellites up to 300 km away.
RC‑135 Rivet
In modern conflict, spectrum denial is the rule, not the exception. Comms will fail. GPS will be jammed. What matters is how well systems degrade and recover.

Too many existing platforms assume or require uninterrupted connectivity, a dangerous illusion. We need systems built for disruption: drones that finish missions autonomously when links drop, sensors that cache data and transmit when able, and munitions that switch to onboard visual navigation when GPS is denied.

This is already happening in Ukraine, where jamming routinely cuts uplinks. Yet newer platforms equipped with visual–inertial odometry and SLAM can navigate and strike without external input, denying the enemy the power to shut them down.

Comms must evolve too. Mesh networks with frequency agility, peer relays, and smart retry logic keep data flowing through chaos. When a drone loses signal, it shouldn’t pause, it should execute.

Man in tank
Systems degraded

Ukrainian frontline units employing handheld RF analyzers routinely identify and localize enemy jamming sources

Additionally, the first warning of an incoming drone can often come from RF signature detection on approach.

Electronic warfare competency must be ingrained at every echelon.

This means that EW must be democratized at the tactical edge, with tools that are low cost and simple to operate at the unit level. Meanwhile, we must upgrade our training programs to ensure frontline personnel can independently manage spectrum threats effectively and immediately with those tools.

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We Must Bring Electronic Warfare to the Tactical Edge

We Must Train Like We’ll Fight

Effective training environments must replicate actual spectrum threats, realistic jamming, spoofing, and communication disruptions.

Military encampment
All unmanned systems must be tested against GPS and C2 jamming at scale as part of their overall evaluation requirements. This means we must increase the frequency and availability of jamming ranges in the continental U.S. Today, domestic GNSS denial testing (when conducted at all) often spans less than 15 minutes per duration due to FAA and other governing agency considerations. There are numerous stories of US defense startups who’ve resorted to smuggling their hardware into Ukraine specifically to get access to realistic testing scenarios that could have been recreated closer to home.
Realistic training ensures troops and systems are validated under authentic combat conditions, significantly enhancing readiness and tactical proficiency, and ensuring all troops are familiar with the threats of spectrum warfare and understand how to operate in DDIL environments.
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The modern battlefield is flooded with RF signals: from drones, radios, jammers, and command nodes. Advanced AI-driven SIGINT tools can now detect, classify, and geolocate these signals in seconds, even in contested environments.

To exploit this opportunity at scale, we must build a decentralized, AI-enabled electronic warfare network - an “electromagnetic wall” - that turns enemy transmissions into targeting data. Instead of chasing drones one by one, we must neutralize the source. Multi-modal loitering munitions, combining RF homing with optical lock, can autonomously strike enemy jammers, controllers, and radar vehicles. By shooting the archer, not the arrow, we dramatically reduce cost and response time while denying the enemy persistent spectrum access.

We Must Turn Enemy Signals Into Targets

Military Carrier

China’s Strategic Support Force unifies electronic warfare, cyber, and space operations under a single command

Traditional electronic attack relied on brute-force jamming: high-power, wideband noise meant to overwhelm enemy receivers. But in today’s spectrum-contested fight, brute force is blunt force: power-hungry, imprecise, and easy to geolocate. Modern EW demands precision, not volume.

Nowhere is this shift more urgent than in counter-UAS. On the Ukrainian front, unit-level forces deploy briefcase-sized jammers targeting drone uplinks, video feeds, and GNSS bands (900 MHz–2.4 GHz). Mounted on tripods or vehicles, or simply carried into battle by a soldier, these systems sever control links or trigger failsafe routines, neutralizing incoming FPV drones in real time.

We Must Modernize Electronic Attack Capabilities

Instead of firing $100,000 interceptors at $1,000 drones, Ukrainian forces use smart, protocol-aware jammers to deny specific signals, like LoRa, analog video, or GPS L1. Many pair with acoustic or EO sensors, enabling automated detection and disruption within seconds.

This shift toward low-SWaP, software-defined jammers at the tactical edge marks a new doctrine. Jamming is no longer a strategic asset reserved for echelons above; it’s a frontline capability that moves with the fight.

“ Freedom of Action in the EMS is required to conduct operations in all domains.”
Gen. John Hyten
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Prioritize EW Immunity in Acquisition

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Mission  ready

For too long, electromagnetic resilience has been treated as an afterthought in military procurement. That must change. Future acquisition programs must make spectrum survivability a core Key Performance Parameter (KPP). Every new vehicle, drone, munition, or sensor should be validated in DDIL scenarios before deployment. By embedding EW immunity as a requirement from the outset, we ensure platforms are mission-ready, not just lab-certified. The DoD's 2020 Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy calls for this shift in acquisition culture. We must heed it.

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EW effectiveness

Yet too often, coalition partners operate on incompatible waveforms, jamming each other's systems or are unable to share threat data in real time. Initiatives like the Capability Coalition for Electromagnetic Warfare (comprising ten NATO-aligned nations aiding Ukraine) show what’s possible when doctrine and technical standards are aligned.

Open architectures, shared emitter libraries, and unified training environments will define future coalition EW effectiveness.

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NATO 2025 EW

NATO’s 2025 EW symposium declared interoperability a top priority for peer conflict

No modern conflict is fought alone. Interoperability across allied forces, especially in the electromagnetic spectrum, is essential to combined success.

Enable Coalition Spectrum Interoperability

The electromagnetic spectrum spans every domain, land, sea, air, space, and increasingly, civilian infrastructure.

In modern conflict, cell towers, IoT networks, and commercial satellites are not bystanders; they are part of the battlefield. In Ukraine, both sides have weaponized civilian systems.
Ukrainian drones have used Russian SIM cards to fly deep into enemy territory by leveraging local 4G networks. Russia has repeatedly jammed Starlink terminals, essential for Ukrainian command and targeting, underscoring the vulnerability of even resilient commercial networks.
Space assets are equally contested. China and Russia have developed systems capable of jamming satellite uplinks and degrading GPS across wide areas. Passive resilience is no longer enough. We must field autonomous, maneuverable satellites, drones that continue missions without a datalink, and comms architectures that reroute data when networks fail, military or civilian.
Man in tank

Be Ready for EW in All Domains

China's J-16D is expressly designed to disrupt US systems like the AWACS and Aegis

Military Jets
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Gen. David Goldfein

Victory in future conflict will depend on our ability to fight and win in the electromagnetic spectrum.

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff

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Victory will depend on how well we fight through disruption in every domain, using every spectrum-access point wisely, even those we don’t control.

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff

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Ukrainian drones have used Russian SIM cards for in-country control
CX2 is a next-generation defense technology company headquartered in El Segundo, California, dedicated to achieving spectrum dominance for the United States and its allies.

By combining AI-enabled hardware and software, CX2 builds scalable solutions that detect, disrupt, and defend the electromagnetic spectrum across land, air, sea, and space. CX2 was founded by veterans of SpaceX, Meta, Epirus, and DIU, and is backed by the world’s leading defense venture investors